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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON WILLS UNDER THE INDIANA
PROBATE CODE OF 1953
MAX RHEINSTEINt

A will is an instrument looking to the future. It is meant to take
effect at the time of the death of the testator, but some of its provisions
may not become operative until a still later moment, for instance, the
death of a life tenant. A great deal may happen in the interval between
the making of the will and the time or times when its various provisions
will become effective, and many of those events may materially affect or
upset the scheme of distribution which the testator has established.

If the testator is assisted by a skilled draftsman, the various contingencies will have been considered, and, if the circumstances call for

some special provision, appropriate clauses will have been inserted in the
instrument.

Being advised, for example, of the possibility that his aunt

to whom he has left $10,000 may die before him, the testator may provide
that in such case the money shall go to her daughter or be split between
the testator's nephews. If the testator is made aware of the fact that the
apportionment of the estate tax may constitute a problem, he may feel
it advisable to provide expressly that it shall be prorated among all, or
certain, beneficiaries of his will, borne completely by the residuary legatee,
or apportioned in some other way.
If the testator fails to provide for such possibilities, the question
arises as to what the executor is to do. The assets must be distributed,
and the contingency dealt with in some way. Fortunately, the case of the
particular testator will not be the first for which such a question arises.
As a matter of fact, the situations stated are typical, and the law, through
the courts and the legislatures, has developed definite rules to meet them.
If the testator has not stated who should have the $10,000 meant for one
who predeceases him, the law steps in to fill the gap; a common law rule
of venerable age provides that the recipient is the residuary legatee. If
the assets of the estate turn out insufficient for payment of all the legacies,
another rule of stop-gap law tells us that, while as a general rule all legacies abate upon an equal footing, some kinds of legacy, for instance, one
given to a creditor in lieu of payment of his debt, or to the widow in lieu
of dower, or to a dependent relative, is to have priority over ordinary
legacies.
If these rules of law are formulated to correspond to intentions of
the individual testator, they need not be spelled out in the will. The testator, whose intentions coincide with the rules of law, can keep his testat Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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mentary instrument brief. Wills, generally, can be simpler and shorter
where the rules are not out of tune with the notions of the ordinary citizen. If the law undertakes, as it should, to serve the interests of the bulk
of testators the rules should, as far as possible, be drawn to coincide with
those intentions which experience indicates to be generally held by testators. A person whose ideas are not those of the average must, of course,
be free to establish, by express provision, his own scheme.
That will-making should be as simple as possible is a postulate of
particular importance where owners of modest amounts of property are
numerous and where a considerable number of property owners believe
that they do not need a lawyer to make a will. Yet, in the United States
the homemade will is fraught with dangers, and lawyer-made wills tend to
be lengthy and complicated instruments couched in language which a layman is rarely able to understand. One reason for this state of affairs is
the obsolete character of many of the rules of the common law. The bulk
of these were developed by courts of England in the eighteenth century,
that is, in a place and time of habits vastly different'from those of presentday America. In the process of stare decisis these rules have been preserved, unless replaced by laws more consistent with contemporary
American attitudes.
The rules which the English courts worked out as corresponding to
the presumed intention of a testator were characterized by two policies:
First, the heir at law was preferred over all others; and, second, the
average testator was believed to be anxious to preserve the real estate for
his family in general and for their heir in particular.
These policies were, indeed, likely to coincide with the ideas of that
testator whom the judges of the courts of eighteenth century England had
before their minds. He was typically a man the bulk of whose fortune
was invested in land, and who was anxious to preserve this financial basis
of the family's standing and influence undivided in the hand of his eldest
son. Hence, at that time, it was proper to assume that the average testator would rather have legacies go unpaid than have the real estate used
for this purpose; that for the payment of debts he would not want the
real estate touched until the personal estate was completely exhausted;
that he would want any debt secured by a mortgage on a parcel of real
estate to be paid out of the personal estate; that he would wish the subject
matter of a lapsed devise to descend to the heir rather than to the residuary
devisee; and that he would have land not yet owned by the testator at the
execution of the will descend to the heir.
Do such rules still correspond to the intentions of an average testator
in a midwestern state of the United States in the middle of the twentieth
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century? The question appears sufficiently answered by its statement.
There has thus arisen for American legislatures the task of reforming
these rules of law so that they will correspond with the ideas ordinarily
entertained by the average, present-day American rather than with those
of the typical English testator of the days of Lords Kenyon or Stowell.
The enactment of a new probate code would seem to present a unique
opportunity to perform this task. The Indiana General Assembly has
recently enacted such a code. How has it approached the problem ?1
The section of the Code dealing with lapse poses several problems.
Under the traditional stop-gap rules, if the beneficiary of a testamentary
gift predeceased the testator, the legacy or devise2 would lapse. In the
case of a legacy the benefit would accrue to the residuary legatee or, if
none, to the next of kin, while the subject matter of a devise would descend
to the heir unless the testator indicated that the residuary devisee was to
benefit. This obsolete distinction has long ago ceased to be observed in
Indiana,' and the Code continues this modern approach in Section
6-601 (g) (1) .' From the general rule that a devise will not take effect,
unless the devisee survives the testator, this section establishes an exception where a devise is made to a descendant of the testator. Improving
upon the older anti-lapse statute, ' the new section sensibly provides that
the devise shall be treated as if made in favor of the descendants of the
devisee in question, not only if that devisee died in the period between
the execution of the will and the death of the testator, but also if he was
already dead at the time of the execution of the will. The careful way in
which it is stated that the term "descendant" is to include persons related
to the original beneficiary by adoption or illegitimacy constitutes another
improvement.
In other respects, however, the wording of the anti-lapse statute gives
rise to doubts. Under Section 6-601 (g) (2) the "property . . .devised"
1. The Indiana Probate Code is to a considerable extent based upon the Model
Probate Code, prepared for the Probate Law Division of the Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, by its Model Probate Code
Committee in cooperation with the Research Staff of the University of Michigan Law
School. Much of what is said will also apply to that Code, certain aspects of which have
already been discussed in the writer's article on The Model Probate Code: A Critique,
48 COL. L. REv. 534 (1948).
2. In the Code the term "devise" is defined to mean both devise and legacy of traditional terminology, and throughout the Code the term is, with few exceptions, used in
this sense. INn. ANN. STAT. § 6-103 (Burns 1953). In the following, the same terminology will be used unless the context requires, as in the passage of the text above, that
legacy and devise be distinguished from each other.
3. Holbrook v. McCleary, 79 Ind. 167 (1881).
4. The allusions in text to a section without further explanation are to I,-. ANN.
STAT.

5.

(Burns 1953).
IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 7-709 (Burns 1933).
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to a descendant who fails to survive the testator is to "vest" in the surviving issue of the original devisee. It is proper to speak of the "vesting"
of property in the case of a specific devise, especially since, in contrast to
the previous situation in Indiana, under the new Code title to the assets of
the personal estate, like the title to those of the real estate, no longer
passes to the executor, but directly "to the person to whom it is devised ...."' What property, however, is to "vest" in a general legatee?
This provision apparently means no more than that the claim for the payment of their legacy is acquired by the issue of the original legatee in the
same way as if they had been named in the will.
The provision attracts attention, however, to a more general problem,
namely that of determining from whom a general legatee can claim
the payment of his legacy. It can hardly be assumed that the draftsmen of the Code intended to change the traditional rule under which
general legacies are payable by the personal representative in the course of
the administration. However, if the Code is to be applied literally, it seems
as if the personal representative is not entitled to make such payment.
Pursuant to Section 7-123, the persons to whom the property of the decedent is devised acquire it "chargeable with the expenses of administering the estate, the payment of other claims and allowances." "Claims"
are defined so as not to include general legacies." It may then be asked
out of what assets the executor is to pay these legacies. The draftsmen
had either lost sight of general legacies or they entertained a vague, but
incorrect, view that upon the death of the decedent the general legatees
would acquire a property interest in the assets of the estate. They would
acquire such an interest if they were beneficiaries of a trust; however, it
is generally accepted that as general legatees they do not acquire such a
position,' and it is improbable that the draftsmen of the Code wished to
give it to -them. Unfortunately they failed to include general legacies
among the claims with which the assets of the estate are charged when
title to them passes from the decedent to the special and residuary legatees.
The wording of the anti-lapse provision is apt to create another
problem. Quite properly the draftsmen were anxious to include within
6. Section 7-123. In the face of this seemingly clear provision, the Commission
Comment to § 7-701 asserts that the personal representative "takes title to the personal
property but not to the real estate, the same as under the present law." As to this surprising contradiction, see Note, Possession and Control of Estate Property During Ad-

ministration: IdianaProbate Code Section 13o, 29 IND. L.J. 251, 260 (1954).
7. "'Claims' include liabilities of the decedent which survive, whether arising in
contract or in tort or otherwise, funeral expenses, the expense of the tombstone, expenses

of administration and all estate and inheritance taxes." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-103 (Burns
1953).
8. Contra: Chase National Bank of New York City v. Sayles, 11 F.2d 948, 48
A.L.R. 207 (1st Cir. 1926). But see BOGERT, TRUSTS § 12 (3d ed. 1952).
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the benefit of the anti-lapse statute not only natural descendants of the
testator but also persons who have entered the family by adoption.9 For
understandable reasons the draftsmen did not wish, however, to extend
this benefit to one who has been adopted as an adult. Adoptions of
adults are infrequent, but still possible under the laws of some American
states and of several foreign countries. The Code provides that, in orider
to benefit from the anti-lapse statute, the adopted person must be one who
was adopted "during his minority." Assume that a testator has given a
legacy to his son, that the son has predeceased him and he is survived by
an adoptive daughter whom the son adopted when she was nineteen years
of age. Assume further that at the time of the adoption the son was a
resident of Indiana and the child a resident of Illinois. Under the law of
the latter state a female person ceases to be a minor when she completes
her eighteenth year of age,1" while in Indiana the age of majority seems
to be twenty-one for both male and female.1 May the daughter benefit
from the Indiana anti-lapse statute? If the text had used a certain age,
such as eighteen or twenty-one years, rather than a legal concept, which
has no meaning except within the context of a particular legal system and
which must be determined in the frequently cumbersome process of the
law of conflict of laws, troublesome litigation might have been prevented.
By its own provision the lapse statute, Section 6-601 (g) (1), does
not apply to a residuary gift. It is left to speculation, in a situation where
several beneficiaries are named in the residuary clause and one fails to
take, whether his share should accrue to the benefit of the others or pass
intestate." The cause for litigation could have been removed if this
much debated question" had been answered in the new Code.
The Code has also left undecided another famous controversy which
has arisen in connection with anti-lapse statutes. When a devise to a
debtor of the testator who has predeceased him is declared by the statute
not to lapse but to accrue to the benefit of a descendant of the beneficiary
9. As to the former law, compare Peirce v. Farmers State Bank of Valparaiso, 222
Ind. 116, 51 N.E.2d 480 (1943), with Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899
(1934).
10. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 110, § 380 (1940).
11. In § 8-101 the Probate Code defines as an "incompetent," among others "any
person who is . . . [u]nder the age of majority, . . ." What the age of majority is,
however, is not stated in the Code. In the law on civil procedure it is stated that "[t]he
phrase 'under legal disabilities' includes persons within the age of twenty-one [211
years...."

IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-4701 (Burns 1946 Repl.).

No other statutory provi-

sion is referred to in the index to Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes.
12. Formerly Indiana held that a lapsed residuary devise fell into the residue. West
v. West, 89 Ind. 529 (1883) ; Holbrook v. McCleary, 79 Ind. 167 (1881) ; Gray v. Bailey,
42 Ind. 349 (1873) ; and Hedges v. Payne, 85 Ind. App. 394, 154 N.E. 393 (1926).
13. See George Washington University v. Riggs National Bank, 88 F.2d 771 (D.C.
Cir. 1936) ; In re Gray's Estate 147 Pa. 67, 23 Atl. 205 (1892).
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named, the question then is does the descendant take the devise subject to,
or free from, the debt ?" A statutory answer would have been desirable.
In the matter of the order in which assets of the estate are to be used
for payment of claims, the Code radically breaks with the ancient rule
which required that all personalty be exhausted before the realty could
be touched.1" Section 7-1103 establishes a simple order of application
of assets in which both kinds of property are treated equally." Indirectly,
this Section also establishes the order in which devises are to abate, wisely
leaving room to priorities for such special kinds of devises as those to
the surviving spouse, to a dependent relative, or those meant to provide
for the payment of the testator's debts, for the erection of a monument,
or for the maintenance of his grave.'
In all this the Code would seem
to correspond to the notions generally held by the average testator in
present-day America. By expressly stating that no preference as between
real and personal property shall be made in the matter of payment of
legacies, the Code has also done away with the obsolete and obnoxious
rule which prevented the use of real property for the payment of legacies
unless the testator had expressly or by implication ordered it in his will.'"
It is provided in Section 7-1104-and wisely so-that in all cases
in which assets of the estate have been sold or taken for the payment of
claims, general legacies, the family allowance, the shares of pretermitted
heirs, or the indefeasible share of a surviving spouse, "other legatees and
devisees"'" shall contribute according to their respective interests to the
legatee or devisee "whose legacy or devise has been sold or taken,"2

so

as to accomplish an abatement in accordance with the provisions of
Section 7-1103.
Since the residuary devise would thus abate first, the provision of
Section 7-1104 seems to bolster the contention that the claim of the
Federal Government for estate tax is to be paid out of the residue rather
than ratably apportioned among all the beneficiaries. The majority of
the state courts has adopted the former rule, but the rule of apportion14. See Mechem, Some Problems Arising Under Anti-lapse Statutes, 19
REV. 1, 20 (1933).
15. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-1107 (Burns 1933).
16. The provision literally corresponds to § 184 of the MODEL

IOWA

L.

PROBATE CODE.

17. See the Comment to the corresponding § 184 of the MODEL PROBATE CODE.
18. Warlick v. Boone, 120 Kan. 148, 242 Pac. 135 (1926) ; Comment, 36 MIcH. L.

Rv. 297, 308 (1937) ; NEW

YORK LAW REVISION COM ISSION,

1937

REPORT

971.

19. Here the Code strays from its uniform terminology under which "devisee" in-

cludes "legatee"; see note 2 supra.
20. This wording of the Code is not entirely accurate; what is sold or taken is, of
course, not the legacy or devise but the asset bequeathed or devised.
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ment has been established by statute in an increasing number of states"'
and has even been applied without the help of a statute.22 The question
is whether the testator who has not included any specific instructions on
the apportionment of the estate tax is more likely to assume that it will
be borne entirely by the residuary beneficiary or that it will be ratably
apportioned among all beneficiaries. The answer is not easy. In 1930
New York's Decedent Estate Commission believed that proration was
the method most generally intended by testators.23 Under a scheme widely
followed by draftsmen in this country, it is, indeed, customary to provide
for the surviving spouse and the immediate family by way of residuary
devise, and it may well be argued that a testator is unlikely to intend that
the burden of estate tax be fully borne by his chief beneficiaries. But
can it be said generally that he would want the legacies given other relatives to abate for tax payment purposes? Furthermore, what is the testator's intention where he provides for his wife and family by particular
devises and gives to charity whatever may be left of his net estate?
Regulation of the problem by express provision of statute would
seem to have been specially desirable in Indiana, where the law is not
clear. In a decision of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, the state of Indiana seems to have been regarded as one following the rule of non-apportionment.24 However, in the only reported
Indiana decision which touches upon the problem, "5 the court emphatically
stated that the problem of determining the burden of estate taxes ought
to be answered "equitably" and that "equality is equity.'""R On this basis
the court ordered the apportionment of the tax burden among an intestate
decedent's heirs and the person who had been his joint tenant of real
estate and other assets. The joint tenant had obtained the sole title to
these assets through the death of the decedent, and, for the purpose of
computing the taxable estate, the value of their acquisition was to be
added under the federal estate tax law to the assets left by the decedent.
This opinion would seem to raise sufficient doubt as to which of the two
competing rules of law applies in Indiana. The absence of a statutory
21. Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes, 54 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1940) ; Reidy,
Apportionment of Estate Taxes, 88 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 623 (1949) ; Reidy, Problems
of Apportionment of Estate Taxes Under State Statutes, (A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law) 1949 PROCEEDINGS 23; Note, Apportionment of Federal

Estate Taxes: Which Funds Bear the Burden, 40 COL. L. REv. 690 (1940) ; Note, Statutory Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1022 (1949).

22. Hampton's Administrators v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920).
23. See the Commission Note following N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 124.
24. Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 663 (1937).
25. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136, 96
N.E.2d 918 (1951).
26. Id. at 155, 96 N.E.2d at 927.
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provision renders it advisable for the draftsman to insert in every will a
clause indicating the distribution of the tax burden whenever the estate
is large enough to be subject to estate tax.
If a piece of land is charged with a mortgage or similar encumbrance,
under the common law the heir or devisee was entitled to have the mortgagee's claim paid out of the personal estate so that the land would be
exonerated. 27 Like so many others, this rule, too, expresses that policy
of eighteenth century English law which sought to favor recipients of
realty over those of personalty. In its home country the rule of exoneration was considered obsolete and abolished by statute as early as 1854.8
In Indiana, the problem was previously dealt with in a statutory provision which seemed to follow the traditional rule2 ' but which, by its
language, created many doubts3" that appear never to have been resolved
by any reported decision. Fortunately these doubts have now been laid
to rest by Section 7-1109 of the new Code, which is a special application
of the general policy of abolishing the ancient preference for takers of
real estate.31 The new provision is based upon Section 189 of the Model
27. See Note, ExoneratioL of Specific Property from Iincumbrances Existing at the
Death of the Testator or Ancestor, 40 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1927).
28. Real Estate Charges Act, 1854 (Locke King's Act), 17 & 18 VicT. c. 113; 40 &
41 VicT. c. 34 (1877) and see also Stat. 30 & 31 VicT. c. 69 (1867).
29. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-1137 (Burns 1933) provided: "Whenever any person shall
have devised his estate, or any part thereof, and any of his real estate subject to a mortgage executed by such testator shall descend to an heir or pass to a devisee, and no
specific direction is given in the will for the payment of such mortgage, the same shall
be discharged as follows:
First. If such testator shall have charged any particular part of his estate, real or
personal, with the payment of his debts, such mortgage shall be considered a part of
such debts.
Second. If the will contains no direction as to what part of his estate shall be taken
for the payment of his debts, and any part of his personal estate shall be unbequeathed
or undisposed of by his will, such mortgage shall be included among his debts to be discharged out of such estate unbequeathed or undisposed of."
30. By its text, § 6-1137 was to apply only to "a mortgage executed by the testator."
See note 28 supra. What was to be done in the case of a mortgage which had been placed
upon the land before its acquisition by the testator but for which he had assumed personal liability? Was exoneration excluded unless, as the old English cases expressed it,
"the testator had made the debt his own"? Woods v. Huntingford, 3 Ves. Jun. 128, 30
Eng. Rep. 930 (Rolls Ct. 1796) ; Duke of Ancaster v. Mayer, 1 Bro. C. C. 454, 28 Eng.
Rep. 1237 (Ch. 1785). What did this cryptic phrase mean? The cases are anything but
clear. See Pleasants v. Flood, 89 Va. 96, 15 S.E. 504 (1892) ; Townshend v. Mostyn, 26
Beav. 72, 53 Eng. Rep. 823 (Rolls Ct. 1858) ; Barham v. Earl of Thanet, 3 My. & K."
607, 40 Eng. Rep. 231 (Ch. 1834) ; Shafto v. Shafto, 1 Cox 207, 29 Eng. Rep. 1131. (Ch.
1786).
In the second alternative of the-statute, see note 28 supra, could exoneration be
claimed out of that part of the personal property which, while not bequeathed specifically,
was needed for the payment of general legacies, or which was to pass to the residuary
legatee? Or could exoneration be claimed only out of personal property passing by
partial intestacy?
31.
XD. ANN. STAT. § 7-901 (Burns 1953).
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Probate Code, and, in accordance with it, makes it clear that the legatee
of a specific chattel which is encumbered with a security interest shall not
be entitled to reimbursement out of the general assets.
Going beyond the text of the Model Code, the draftsmen have added
the following sentence in Section 7-1109: "If a mortgagee receives payment on a claim based upon the obligation secured by such mortgage, the
devise which was subject to such mortgage shall be charged with the reimbursement to the estate of the amount of such payment for the benefit
of the distributees entitled thereto." The policy expressed in this sentence
appears to be well founded,32 but the wording falls short of legal accuracy,
since it is not the devise but the piece of land, the chattel, or the chose in
action, which is actually subject to the mortgage. It may further be
questioned whether the "devise" is really to be charged with the reimbursement of the estate. If, for example, the devisee has sold the asset
to a third party, one may ask whether the executor is entitled to proceed
against the purchaser who has acquired the "devise" or whether he is
limited to a personal claim against the devisee. 3
One of the Code's striking innovations is its provision for the disposition of that income which accrues during the time required for the
administration of the estate. At common law title to realty specifically
devised passes to the devisee immediately upon the testator's death. At
the same moment he becomes entitled to possession and, consequently, to
all profits and rents which become collectible after the testator's death.
But title to specifically bequeathed personalty does not pass directly to the
legatee but to the personal representative. Unless the asset is sold to
satisfy claims against the estate, the legatee will receive it upon distribu32. The possibility of payment to the mortgagee out of the general assets of the
estate is expressly provided for in IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-820 (Burns 1953), but the personal representative is not supposed to make any such payment without prior authorization or subsequent approval by the court.
33. The sentence which gives rise to this problem cannot be traced to Section 20 of
the NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW as is stated in the report following the section.
See the Comments following IND. ANN. STAT. §.7-1109 (Burns 1953). Section 20 of the
New York law is concerned exclusively with the problem of exoneration of assets of
personal property specifically bequeathed. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 20. The corresponding provisions on the exoneration of real estate are contained in the real property
law. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 250.
The wording of § 20, the second sentence of which elegantly solves a problem left
open in the Indiana Code, is:
"Where personal property subject to any lien, mortgage or pledge is specifically
bequeathed by will, the legatee must satisfy the lien, mortgage or pledge out of his own
property without resorting to the executors of his testator unless there be in the will of
such testator a direction, expressly or by necessary implication, that such mortgage, lien
or pledge be otherwise paid. Where such personal property specifically bequeathed has
been made subject to any lien, mortgage or pledge with other personal property, the
specifically bequeathed property shall bear its proportionate share of the total lien, mortgage or pledge." N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 20.
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tion. Who is entitled, in the absence of specific direction in the will, to
the increments, fruits, and profits produced during administration by an
asset specifically bequeathed? The traditional answer has been that they
belong to the legatee.34
The rule is based upon the assumption that such a result corresponds
to the intentions of the average testator. When the testator by his last
will and testament specifically bequeaths his livestock, his bonds, or his
shares of corporate stock, he means to dispose of them as of his death,
and it can safely be assumed that he intends and expects that the legatees
enjoy the profits not later than the devisee of the farm is to enjoy the
crops. The testator may have some vague notion that his estate will have
to go through a process of administration which may take time, but it is
unlikely that he intends that rents, profits, and increments produced
during the period of administration shall go to the residuary legatee, the
next of kin, or the heir. If the testator for some reason wants a person
other than the legatee or devisee to take the interim gain on assets specifically bequeathed or devised he can achieve that result by establishing
a life estate or some other estate of limited duration. It will be a rare
case, however, in which a testator intends to give to his residuary devisee
or legatee an estate limited to the period of administration in all assets
specifically devised or bequeathed to others. This, however, is exactly
what the new Probate Code does when it provides in Section 7-1107 that
"[u]nless the decedent's will provides otherwise, all income received by
the personal representative during the administration of the estate shall
constitute an asset of the estate the same as any other asset and the personal representative shall disburse, distribute, account for and administer
said income as a part of the corpus of the estate." In other words, the
produce of specific legacies bequeathed, as well as the crops, rents, and
other profits of land specifically devised belong, if they are received by
the personal representative during the administration of the estate, not
to the particular beneficiary but to the residuary legatee.
In attempted justification for this innovation, the draftsmen of the
Code urge the need of a rule uniform throughout the State; they suggest
that in certain counties the rule advocated by them has already been observed, and they intimate, as of controlling importance, the desirability
of avoiding calls for contributions by putting this income into the corpus
of the estate."5 Unquestionably it is true that the more cash there is available in the general assets of the estate the easier it will be to pay the claims
34. ATKINSON, WmLs § 135 (2d ed. 1953) ;
see Note, 116 A.L.R. 1129 (1938).
35. See the Comments following IN. AxN.

2 PAGE, WILLS § 1597 (3d ed. 1941);
STAT.

§ 7-1107 (Burns 1953).
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which are to be satisfied from those assets. It may be asked, however,
whether such cash should be raised from income produced by things which
have been otherwise specifically bequeathed or devised. In its provision
as to the order of application of assets the Code recognizes that the average testator would not want assets which he specifically bequeathed or devised to be used to pay claims as long as general assets are available. 6 To
give to the residuary legatee the income produced by assets which have
been so bequeathed or devised is to apply a different presumption as to
the average testator's intention.
Vith respect to pre-Code practice in Indiana it is impossible for one,
not an Indiana lawyer, to confirm or contradict the Commission's observation. It would seem improbable, however, that there should have been
a single county in Indiana in which the crops, the rents, and the other
profits, which have been produced by land specifically devised and which
have not been particularly charged by the will with the payment of debts,
should ever have been regarded as belonging to the legatee of the residue
of the personal estate.
Another strange result seems to be produced by the way Section
7-1107 is phrased. The residuary legatee is to have that income which
is ". . . received by the personal representative during the administration
of the estate ...."", How long the income produced by a piece of land
or other asset is to enure to the benefit of the residuary and when it will
begin to accrue to the specific devisee or legatee depends, thus, upon the
length of the period of administration; the longer it lasts, the better for
the residuary devisee. Furthermore, what is the meaning of the word
"received" in the above phrase? What happens to income which is not
"received" by the personal representative, for instance, rents which the
personal representative has failed to collect during the period of administration, or dividends from shares of stock which he has distributed to
the specific legatee in a "partial distribution" pursuant to Section
7-1101 ?" Shall the allocation of income between specific and residuary
legatee really depend upon such accidental circumstances or, even worse,
upon the personal discretion of the executor? In these respects the Section simply cannot have the meaning which a literal reading of its text
conveys, but what else it may mean will not be determined until the
Supreme Court of Indiana has spoken.
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-1103 (Burns 1953).
37. Emphasis added.
38. On the problem of whether, under the Code, the legal representative is under a
duty to collect the income from the assets of the estate, see Note, Possession and Control
of Estate Property During Administration: Indiana Probate Code Section i3o, 29 IND.
L.J. 251, 256, 262 (1954).
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All these complications can be avoided, of course, if the decedent
expressly provides in his will that the income produced during the period
of administration from any asset shall accrue to the benefit of the specific
legatee or devisee. Such a clause would have been unnecessary under the
old law because the appropriate rule corresponded more nearly to the intention of the average testator. The same intentions would seem to prevail today. 9 Unless a distribution of income which can safely be presumed contrary to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of testators
is to take place, it will now be necessary for many Indiana wills to be
lengthened by an income allocation clause.4"
In line with the rule that the income produced during administration
is to accrue to the general assets of the estate, the Code provides, in Section 7-1108, that "[g]eneral legacies shall not bear interest, unless a
contrary intent is indicated by the will." Again it seems that this new
rule is at variance with the intention of the average testator.
Under the traditional approach the estate has not been held subject
to a duty to pay interest to general legatees during that period which is
necessary, under normal conditions, for the executor to settle the estate.
In the English ecclesiastical courts this period was fixed at a maximum
of one year after death. In this country changes were made in many
states by postponing the beginning of "the executor's year" to the date
of the issuance of letters testamentary, or by shortening the "normal"
period of administration to ten, nine, or even fewer months. Upon the
expiration of the executor's year, or the statutory period substituted for
it, interest began to be payable to general legatees. 1 A special rule was
developed as to a general legacy given to a person whom the testator had
supported and whom he apparently desired to support after his death
by means of a general legacy large enough to produce income. In accordance with this presumed intention of the testator, interest on such
legacies was held to run from the moment of the testator's death.42 While
39. Indiana is not the only state where the traditional rules on the allocation of
income from assets specifically devised or bequeathed have been changed. The statutes
are discussed and classified in Comment, Probate and Administration: Disposition of
Rents and Profits of Realty, 2 MoNT. L. REv. 148 (1941), a summary of which is given
in Note, 29 IND. L.J. 251, 263, n. 55 (1954).
40. For certain problems which may arise under more or less specific provisions of
a will, see id. at 265.
41. See Brown v. Bernhamer, 159 Ind. 538, 65 N.E. 580 (1902) ; Clark v. Helm, 130
Ind. 117, 29 N.E. 568, see Note, 14 L.R.A. 716 (1891) ; Case v. Case, 51 Ind. 277 (1875) ;
Roberts v. Malin, 5 Ind. 18 (1854); Evans, The Payment of Legacies, 2 IDAHo L.J. 163

(1932).

42. See Alig v. Levey, 219 Ind. 618, 39 N.E.2d 137 (1942) ; Stimson v. Rountree, 51
Ind. App. 207, 99 N.E. 439 (1912); Lewis, When Does Interest Begin to Run on Legacies?, 16 MINN. L. REv. 226 (1932); 39 YALE L.J. 590 (1930).
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the new statute leaves open the possibility that a testator's special intention be honored where it is "indicated in the will," the wise draftsman
will now find it advisable expressly to spell out such an intention. Again,
we see, that wills drafting has been made more complicated.
Testators in their wills may not only fail to tell what should be done
in the case of certain contingencies, such as the prior death of a legatee or
the inadequacy of the assets for payment of legacies, but may also frequently use words or phrases which are ambiguous. If a testator has
given a legacy "to the children of X," whom did he mean to include if X,
in addition to two children born in lawful wedlock, has a third child who
was born illegitimate but legitimated by subsequent marriage, a fourth
child who was born and has remained illegitimate, and a fifth child who
has entered the family by adoption? There are other possibilities4 3 and
every one of these individuals might be called a child of X. Which ones
the testator intended to include in his testamentary gift is open to conjecture.
The testator may also have given a life estate in certain assets to his
son, with remainder over to his son's wife. The son may have had one
wife at the time the will was executed and another at the death of the
testator. Was it the deceased's intention to benefit that individual woman
whom he knew as his daughter-in-law, or whatever woman, possibly unknown to him, who might survive his son as a widow ?
Suppose the will includes a legacy to Z of what the testator describes
as "all my money," while the residue is given to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The decedent's estate consists of a small
amount of cash, a checking account of several hundred dollars, a savings
account of $1,500, stocks and bonds amounting to some $50,000, and
real estate worth some $15,000. 4" In some sense every combination of
these assets of the testator can be called his "money." 46
In all such cases an attempt may be made to find out what the testator
really meant when, at a certain day and place, he used the ambiguous term.
But, under the prevailing limits on admissible evidence, we shall rarely
succeed, and even if we do we may discover no more than that the testator
used the ambiguous word or phrase without any clearly defined intent.
43. For further illustrative fact situations see, e.g., Peirce v. Farmers State Bank of
Valparaiso, 222 Ind. 116, 51 N.E.2d 480 (1943) ; Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192
N.E. 899 (1934) ; Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925) ; Nickerson v.
Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, 115 N.E. 588 (1919) ; Haddon v. Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 551,
97 N.E. 811 (1912) ; Harness v. Harness, 50 Ind. App. 364, 98 N.E. 357 (1912).
44. Cf. It re Drew [1899] 1 Ch. 336.
45. For another possible situation see Hall v. Bledsoe, 83 Ind. App. 622, 149 N.E.
448 (1925).
46. Cf. Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399.
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If no showing of actual intent is made, the court will ascribe to the vague
term that meaning which is indicated by what may be called the rule of
authoritative explanation. 7 These rules, obviously, should lead the court
to give the ambiguous term that meaning which it is most likely to have
when used by an average testator.
Are the existing rules of authoritative explanation adequate? The
problem is analogous to that which exists with respect to the rules of stopgap law, and the practice of following precedent is apt to produce the
same result, that is, the preservation of rules after the reasons for them
have disappeared. In England a highly technical meaning of the term
"my money," which may well have corresponded to the eighteenth century
notions was carried over into the twentieth century until it was at long
last discarded by the House of Lords.4 The rule designed to explain the
meaning of the word "children" was established at a time when adoption
was rare or unknown, but by most courts of this country it has been continued into a period in which adoption has come to be commonplace. A
decision by which a testator's intention was shockingly frustrated in this
way was rendered in Indiana as late as 1943."9
Perhaps in the light of this case, the draftsmen of the new Code
have modernized the rule explaining the term "children" so as to include
adoptive children" and, indeed, have introduced a rule which generally
provides that whenever a devise is made ".

.

to a person or persons

described by relationship to the testator or to another, any person adopted
during minority before the death of the testator shall be considered the
child of his adopting parent or parents and not the child of his natural or
previous adopting parents. .. .""
In the frequent cases of a provision for the benefit of "the relatives,"
"the family," "the heirs," or "the next of kin" of himself or some other
person, the testator's intent is again not expressed with sufficient clarity.5 2
In the Restatement of Property the rule of authoritative explanation is
stated to the effect that "[w]hen a limitation is in favor of the 'family'
of a designated person, then, unless a contrary intent of the conveyor is
found from additional language or circumstances, the possible takers
thereunder include the spouse and the issue of the designated person, and
47. RHEINSTEIN, CASES ON DECDENTS' ESTATES 731 (1947).
48. Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399.
49. Peirce v. Farmers State Bank of Valparaiso, 222 Ind. 116, 51 N.E.2d 480 (1943).
50. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-103 (Burns 1953).
51. INn. ANN. STAT. § 6-601(d) (Burns 1953). On the doubts which may arise in
connection with the concept of "adopted during minority," see p. 156 supra.
52. See Casner, Construction of Gifts to "Heirs" and the Like, 53 HARv. L. REv.

207 (1939).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
no other person. '"" "Relatives" is presented in the Restatement as having
the sane meaning as "next of kin,"54 who are defined as "those who
under the applicable local law would succeed to the personal property of
the designated ancestor if such ancestor died intestate at the time when
the group is to be ascertained" and the time at which the group is to be
ascertained is set at the time "of the death of the designated ancestor,
unless an intent of the conveyor to have the statute applied as of some
other date is found from additional language or circumstances."5 The
term "heir" is similarly defined, except that reference is made to the
local law .

"

[applicable] to property of the type which is the
subject matter of the . . ." devise.56
.

.

The draftsmen of the Indiana Probate Code have included rules explaining the terms presently under discussion, but, rather than adopting
the rules of Restatement, they based theirs upon the text of Section 14(4)
of the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947,"' which is less precise and less apt
to prevent confusion.
The four terms "family," "relatives," "heirs," and "next of kin" are
together defined in Section 6-601 (c) in that sense which is traditionally
applied to "heirs" and "next of kin," namely, the totality of the intestate
successors of the person in question. Remote relatives may thus be included in the class, though there might be a question as to whether the
testator meant them when he described the class as the "family" of a certain person. Although the point is doubtful, it would seem to correspond
more closely to the common understanding to limit, as the Restatement
does, the term "family" to the spouse and issue, that is, persons, who are
not only related to each other, but live together in a common household.
The Code is certainly in accordance with common American usage when,
contrary to older views, it includes the spouse in the circle of the family
and the relatives.
In determining a person's intestate successor it is necessary to refer
to the statute of a particular jurisdiction; the Indiana Code provides that
this reference be made as if the ".

.

. person were to die intestate at the

time when such class is to be ascertained, domiciled in this state, and owning the estate so devised." 58 This solution may generally be appropriate,
but the courts should apply it cautiously. Where the testator at the time
of the execution of his will was a resident of another jurisdiction, he
53.

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§ 293 (1940).

54. Id. § 307.
55. Id. § 308
56. Id. § 305.
57. PA. STAT.
58.

ANN.
IND. ANN. STAT.

tit. 20, § 180.14(4) (1950).
§ 6-601(c) (Burns 1953).
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may have had before his mind the intestacy rules of that place as they
stood at that time. Of course, it is also possible that he used the term
"my heirs," or some equivalent phrase, without caring which particular
individuals would be included in the class. In the latter case it is irrelevant, as far as the testator's intentions are concerned, which state's statute
is used to determine the class of his heirs. In the former, however, his
intention would be upset if the court should look to a statute other than
the one which he actually had in mind.59 Where such an intention can be
found it ought to be honored.
In the case of devises to "the heirs," "the family," "the relatives,"
or "next of kin" of a third person, Section 6-601 (c) makes a distinction
between those which take effect at the testator's death and those where
the devisees' enjoyment is postponed. In the former case the intestate
successors of the third person are to be determined by those laws which
would apply if the third person were to die intestate at the time of the
testator's death, and as if he had been domiciled in Indiana. If T has
given a legacy to the 'heirs" of his brother, B, who is a resident of California or Ireland at the times of both the execution of T's will and of
T's death, the class of takers is thus to be determined by the law of Indiana
and as if B had died simultaneously with T. This solution might upset
T's intention if he had used the phrase after inquiry into, and with implied reference to, the intestacy rules of California, Ireland, or whatever
other jurisdiction he would have found to have been the residence of the
third person whose heirs he intended to benefit.6"
In the case where the devise is not to take effect at the time of the
testator's death it is not clearly spelled out in Section 6-601 (c) of the
Code what jurisdiction's laws are to be used to determine the intestate
successors of a third person. After providing for the devise which takes
effect at the testator's death, the text continues: "With respect to a devise which does not take effect at the testator's death, the time when such
class is to be ascertained shall be the time when the devise is to take effect
in enjoyment."
59. Under § 14(4) of the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 180.14(4) (1950), which has been the model of § 6-601(c) of the Indiana Code, it was
said that in a devise to the testatrix' heirs the class of takers was to be determined under
the statute which was in effect at the time of the execution of the will rather than under
the statute which was in effect at the time of the testatrix' death, where it could be found
that such was the testatrix' intent. Farmers Trust Co. v. Wilson, 361 Pa. 43, 63 A.2d

14 (1949).
60. See Houghton v. Hughes, 108 Me. 233, 79 Atl. 909, 1913A Ann. Cas. 1287,
1290 (1911); In re Fergusson's Will [1902] 1 Ch. 483, 71 L.J. Ch. 360 (1902). See
Notes, 15 FLA. L.J. 195 (1941), 38 ILL. L. REv. 336 (1944), 42 MicH. L. REV. 1135 (1944),
19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rv. 216 (1942).
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As it stands, this seems to modify the preceding sentence only with
respect to the time as of which the class of intestate successors is to be determined, and would seem to call for application of Indiana law again.
On the other hand it could be that no rule is given as to the applicable
law at all and that the actual intention of the testator in these cases must
be determined without aid of such a rule.
With respect to the time at which the intestate successors of the third
party are to be ascertained in the case of "a devise which does not take
effect at the testator's death," we are referred, as we have seen, to "the
time when the devise is to take effect in enjoyment." An attempt at literal
application of this rule suggests difficulties. Assume T has made a devise in trust to X, as trustee, for the benefit of A for life, remainder to
the heirs of A, none of the heirs to be entitled to possession until he
reaches the age of twenty-one, and the income from his share to be accumulated until such time. The class of A's intestate heirs is to be determined at the different times at which each of them reaches the age of
twenty-one. If, when A dies, she is a widow having three children, aged
three, ten, and thirteen years respectively, who are her heirs? For all
purposes except that of determining the remainderman after her life
estate, the question of whether any one of the children takes will be left in
suspense until at least one reaches the age of twenty-one. If all three die
before they reach the age of twenty-one, the heirs of A then rhay be two
young nephews. The picture may be further complicated if they both die
before reaching twenty-one. The reader can spin forth this example, for
what has been said should indicate that the second sentence of Section
6-601 (c) cannot be applied as written. Most probably the phrase, "time
when the devise is to take effect in enjoyment," means the time when the
interest devised is to vest. 6
The most potent factor causing American wills to be instruments of
such formidable length and awesome complication lies in the unsatisfactory way in which the powers of personal representatives and trustees are
regulated by those rules of law which apply when the testator has not
established his own scheme of management. An English executor has
extensive discretionary powers which he can exercise freely.62 In this
61. In the Comments following the section it is stated that § 6-601(c) is based upon
Section 14(4) of the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947. In the Commission's Comment by
which that Act is accompanied it is stated that in all cases of the kind treated in the
Sub-section in question ". . . it is desirable to have the class determined as of the time
the remainder falls in, unless the testator directs otherwise." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 180.14(4) (1950). This rule is certainly desirable. But has it found expression in the
language of the statute?
62. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 23. See WILLIAMS,
THE LAW OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, especially c. 35 (13th ed. Parry, 1953).
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country the trend of legislation has been to pile one restriction of the
executor's power upon another until he is unable to take any step .of
importance without permission of the court. The extreme of this solicitousness has been reached in the Uniform Probate Code, 3 which has
been accepted as the general model of the Indiana Probate Code.64 Under
the Indiana Code permission of the court must be obtained by the executor
if he wishes to do any one of the following:
(1)
compromise "or in any manner modify the terms of any obligation owing to the estate .
. [or] in lieu of foreclosure, accept a conveyance or transfer of. . . " an asset mortgaged, pledged, or constituting
a lien for securing an obligation owing to the estate ;65
(2)
compromise a claim made against the estate;66 or convey or
transfer in satisfaction of a lien an asset of the estate mortgaged, pledged,
or constituting a lien for securing an obligation owed by the estate ;6"
(3)
sell, mortgage, lease, or exchange any asset of the estate" except "[p]erishable property and other personal property which will depreciate in value if not disposed of promptly, or which will incur loss or
expense by being kept and," except, furthermore, "so much other personal
property as may be necessary to provide allowance to the surviving spouse
and children pending the receipt of other sufficient funds ... .
(4) make a conveyance or lease for the purpose of performing an
executory contract of the decedent."°
The compromise of claims of, or against, the estate is declared not
to be binding upon the estate unless it is made with prior authorization or
receives subsequent approval by the court.71 The sanction of nullity is not
expressly provided in the case of a sale, lease, mortgage or exchange of
an asset made without authorization of the court, but the sections dealing
with such transactions are so phrased as to lead to the conclusion that a
disposition made without decree of court is invalid. In view of the
provisions of the Code it is difficult to imagine a purchaser who would
deal with an executor who would not be armed with such a court decree.
63. Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 538-539.
64. See Simes, The Indiana Probate Code and the Model Probate Code: A Comparison, 29 IND. L.J. 341 (1954).
65. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-705 (Burns 1953).
66. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-818 (Burns 1953).
67. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-820 (Burns 1953).
68. IN . ANN. STAT. §§ 7-903, 7-908, 7-911 (Burns 1953).
69. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-909 (Burns 1953).
70. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-712(a) (Burns 1953). A court order, however, is unnecessary in the event that the personal representative has been empowered by the will
to execute the conveyance or lease. Id. § 7-712(b).
71. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-818 (Burns 1953). "In the absence of prior authorization
or subsequent approval by the court, no compromise shall bind the estate." Ibid.
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The provisions of Section 7-909 protect the purchaser to a limited extent
by allowing an executor to make certain sales without the court's express
authorization.
A prospective purchaser would have little assurance,
however, that a particular sale is one which falls within the privileged
category.
Although the nullity sanction is not stated expressly with respect to
a conveyance or mortgage made without judicial decree for the purpose
of performing an executory contract of the decedent," the cautious transferee will insist upon the presentation of a decree by the executor."
In every one of the following additional situations the executor is
directed to obtain the court's express approval: (1) abandonment of
valueless property, 5 (2) continuation of the business of the decedent,"
(3) investment of funds of the estate,77 (4) payment of a mortgage, lien,
or pledge encumbering an asset of the estate, or renewal or extension of
any obligation secured by such an encumbrance," (5) allowance of claims
not yet due against the estate, 79 (6) extension of credit on sales of assets,"0 (7) platting of land,81 (8) exchange of assets,8" (9) use of the
estate's funds for the purpose of performing an executory contract of
the decedent,8" and (10) making of distributions.84
Only the following transactions are expressly permitted without
court approval: (1) voting stock and giving proxy,85 (2) maintaining
an action for the recovery of assets and trying title," and (3) performing
executory contracts of the decedent insofar as neither the conveyance or
mortgage of an asset nor the incurring of expense to the estate becomes
necessary.87 It is hard to imagine what executory contract could be performed in this way.
72. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
73. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-712(a) (Burns 1953).
74. Unless the circumstances of paragraph (b), see note 67 supra, of this section are
fulfilled, in which event it would seem that the words of the paragraph offer a fair
measure of assurance.
75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-708 (Burns 1953).
76. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-711 (Burns 1953).
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-714 (Burns 1953).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-820 (Burns 1953); see note 64 supra and accompanying
text.
79. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-803 (Burns 1953).
80. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-905 (Burns 1953).
81. INn. ANN. STAT. § 7-922 (Burns 1953).
82. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-923 (Burns 1953).
83. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-713 (Burns 1953).
84. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 7-1101 et seq. (Burns 1953).

85.

IND. ANN. STAT.

86.
87.

INn. ANN. STAT. §§ 7-701, 7-703 (Burns 1953).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-713 (Burns 1953).

§ 7-412 (Burns 1953).
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Under the system of the Code, the executor is not a free agent entrusted with the execution of a decedent's last will and testament, but an
officer of the probate court, which is alone responsible for practically
every step in the course of the administration. This result is surely not
intended by the usual testator.
There are doubtless situations in which it is necessary that responsibility for the administration of an estate, or for certain phases of it, be
assumed by the probate court. Such a situation exists if an estate is
insolvent, or when distributees are in serious disagreement as to whether,
and, if so, upon what terms, a piece of land or other important asset
should be sold. A certain measure of judicial supervision may also be
indicated where the estate is wound up not by the person chosen by the
decedent himself but by an administrator with the will annexed; an administrator de bonis non, or an administrator to collect.
The English method of allowing the powers outlined above to be
exercised freely by the executor seems more desirable. Also to be considered is the procedure in the countries of the Civil Law where the only
task which must normally be performed by a judicial or quasi-judicial
agency is the determination of the person or persons entitled to deal with
the assets of the estate and the issuance to them of an official certificate
of identification. The person or persons so identified are responsible for
the proper settlement and distribution of the estate, and no court will be
involved with the matter unless the estate is insolvent, the creditors are
otherwise endangered, or some dispute arises among the interested parties."8
The system of every decedent's estate being administered under the close
control of a court seems to exist only in two western legal systems, the
American and the Austrian. In Austria this system is the product of the
benevolent paternalism of the bureaucracy of the Hapsburgs. The reasons for its existence in the United States can only be imagined; this
ever-increasing governmental solicitude is, indeed, a development which
would seem anomalous among the general American attitudes. Perhaps
it was more difficult at one time to find persons who could safely be entrusted with the management and settlement of a decedent's estates.
Under frontier conditions it may have been justified to assume that persons likely to have property to leave, or persons likely to be appointed as
executors, would be illiterate or at least lacking in experience.8" If this
88. See Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased

Persons,20 IOWA L. REv. 431 (1935).

89. Perhaps, the presumption of illiteracy is responsible for another institution pe-

culiar to the United States, namely, the solicitude shown by the Post Office Department,
which does not allow a customer to fill in the form of a postal money order as he is

allowed to do everywhere outside of the United States.
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should have been the reason, it is no longer valid.
This development, however, has not been uniform. Texas has preserved the institution of "independent administration" ever since it appeared there for the first time in 1848.9" By simply stating that his executor shall be independent or that the will shall be of the nonintervention
type, a Texas testator can free his executor from all court supervision and
all requirements to obtain judicial permission for any transaction, at
least so long as no complications arise which would require judicial intervention. The institution has worked well; it is said to be widely
used91 and has been adopted in Arizona, Idaho, and Washington.9 2
The striking feature of the system prevailing in the majority of
American states is that it is designed not for the normal but the abnormal
case. This tendency has shown a marked increase. It has decisively influenced the Model Probate Code and, through it, the Indiana Code. The
latter has even gone beyond its model. In an earlier part of this article
we discussed the code provisions which allocate the income from assets
specifically devised to the general assets of the estate and deprive general
legatees of their traditional right to receive interest.93 As indicated, these
innovations are justified in the commission comments upon the ground
that "[b] y making the income a part of the corpus the sale of assets to pay
obligations and also .

.

. a call for contributions will frequently be

avoided."94

The Commission obviously had in mind the estate which does
not have sufficient liquid assets to pay the claims. Of course, not every
estate will have sufficient cash, but often enough the checking and saving
accounts together with life insurance proceeds will suffice. If major
debts or taxes are payable, easily saleable securities may yield the necessary cash. It is not necessary for the statutory scheme for all cases of
administration to be patterned on one which is required only in certain
abnormal cases and which, in the normal case, will simply create unnecessary delay, formality, and expense. The testator who has confidence in
his executor, individual or corporate, will be well advised by appropriate
90. PROBATE ACT of 1848, §110. TEX. ACTS 2d. Leg., R.S. 1848, c. 157, p. 275. The
provision as it now exists reads:
"Any person capable of making a will may so provide in his will that no other action
shall be had in the county court in relation to the settlement of his estate than the probating and re-recording of his will, and the return of an inventory, appraisement and lists of
claims of his estate." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3436 (1948).
91. RICHEY, HISTORY AND COMMENTARY ON TITLE 54-ESTATES OF DECEDENTS
(1952). 9A TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 223, 236 (1952) ; see also SIMKINS, ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN TEXAS 102 (1908).
92. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 38-1902 (1939)
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.68.010-11.68.040

93.

See pp. 160-162 supra.

94.

See the comments following

; IDAHO
(1951).

CODE ANN.

IND. ANN. STAT.

§§ 15-237, 15-238 (1947);

§ 7-1107 (Burns 1953).
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provisions in his will to eliminate these superfluous formalities. The will
of the informed testator to be well drafted must become a formidable instrument. The Indiana Probate Code of 1953 has failed to facilitate the
job of the draftsmen.
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